Very preliminary, comments invited 1 .
per capita income. If welfare levels converge, these consumption patterns also converge towards a universal pattern. We assume that the labour markets for low-and high-skilled workers clear. In the baseline, labour does not migrate. Tables 1 and 2 provide some background information about the CEEC economies. Table 1 reveals that EU enlargement implies an increase in the EU population by around 28%, while GDP will rise only by a mere 4%. Table 2 presents the export and import shares of the CEECs. Especially Hungary is a relatively open as it exports more than half of its GDP, a feature that is common for smaller countries. The CEEC's trade patterns are geared to the EU. Intra CEEC trade is only marginal. Trade with the rest of the world mainly concerns the Rest OECD.
All CEECs experience a trade deficit in 1997. Indeed, table 1 reveals that investment/GDP ratio is higher than the saving/GDP ratio. A large share of investment is thus financed by foreign capital, particularly in Poland. Hence, the trade deficit is associated with a net inward FDI flow. source: Purdue (2001) . Table 3 shows the sectoral output shares for all sixteen sectors distinguished in WorldScan, both for the EU and the CEECs. It shows that Agriculture, Food Processing and Textiles contribute relatively more to GDP in the CEEC's than in the EU. Electronic and Transport Equipment and Other Services contribute relatively little to GDP in these countries.
Within the CEEC, there exist some remarkable differences. In Hungary Agriculture, Food Processing, Other Manufacturing and Metals are less important than in Poland and the Rest CEEC. These sectors are typically low-skilled labour intensive. Other Services is more important in Hungary than in the other regions. In the Rest CEEC, manufacturing contributes much to GDP, especially Textiles and Other
Manufacturing. Services are less important, especially Trade and Other Services. 
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This section discusses three shocks of EU-enlargement: (i) a gradual removal of formal barriers and the adoption of the common external tariff (CET), 3 (ii) accession to the internal market, and (iii) free movement of labour. In the experiments, we assume that Poland and Hungary enter the EU in 2004 and the Rest CEEC in 2007. The effects, evaluated in the year 2020, should be interpreted as the allocative implications of the three shocks and possible implications through capital accumulation. We do not analyse some other potential implications of enlargement such as an increase in political stability or the fact that accession to the EU may be followed by EMU membership after some time. Finally, we do not explore the implications of changes in the Common Agricultural Policies of the EU or the EU policies with respect to the Structural Funds. The rest of this section discusses how we determine the size of the latter two shocks (the first shock consists of removing the existing trade barriers and adoption of a CET, an appendix providing these numbers is available upon request).
3.
Accession of the CEECs to the EU implies a move from an almost free-trade area towards a customs union. This means that all remaining bilateral formal trade barriers will be abolished. In addition, the external tariffs with respect to third countries will be set equal to the common external tariff (CET)of the EU. An appendix that demonstrates the magnitude of the existing export and import tariffs, both between the EU and the CEECs, and of these countries vis a vis third countries is available upon request. The first key element of the CEECs accession to the Single Market is that administrative barriers to trade are eliminated or at least reduced to levels comparable to those between current EU members; think of reduced costs of passing customs at the frontier: less time delays, less formalities etc. Probably more important is the reduction in technical barriers to trade. The Single Market reduces these technical barriers by means of mutual recognition of different technical regulations, minimum requirements and harmonisation of rules and regulations. 4 Risk and uncertainty is a second impediment on trade that will be mitigated by the CEECs accession to the EU. One type of risk is the possibility that somewhere in the link from producer to consumer some agent defaults. This is especially important for goods moving from East to West, as export credit
¡ guarantees are less well developed in the CEECs. A second type of risk is political risk, a risk more relevant for goods moving from West to East (as insurance does not cover these risks and as democracies are thought to be less stable in the CEECs).
To measure the economic consequences of accession to the internal market, we estimate gravity equations on the industry level to obtain potential trade flows between the CEECs and the current EU members, i.e. trade as if the CEECs were already EU members.
We follow Bergstrand (1989) in estimating the following gravity model (see Box):
Reminiscent to the law of gravity in physics, the gravity model suggests that the trade flow between two countries depends positively on their size and negatively on the distance between them. In economic terms, trade flows between two countries depend on the importer's demand and the exporters supply and on the cost of trade. The latter is proxied by distance and specific characteristics of the bilateral country relation, like sharing a language or having a common border. The importer's demand and exporter's supply is proxied for by their outputs and per capita incomes.
The early contributions applying the gravity approach (e.g. Tinbergen, 1962) , did not provide a theoretical motivation for the model. Nevertheless, the model evolved to becoming the workhorse model of empirical international trade. Helpman and Krugman (1985) show, however, that the basic gravity equation is simply derived from a trade model with differentiated goods. Deardorff (1995) , moreover, demonstrates that the gravity equation is consistent with the Heckscher-Ohlin theory of international trade. Though this consistency of the gravity model with different trade models hinders the gravity model's usefulness for model testing and selection, it increases the confidence in its use as a predictor for (potential) trade patterns.
Previous studies on the potential trade between CEECs and the current EU members largely restrict themselves to an economy-wide perspective. Without questioning the value of the insights delivered by the economy-wide perspective, it is evident -given the relative size of the CEECs to the current EU -that an industry-level analysis is required to shed light on potentially painful adjustment problems and promising opportunities.
The gravity model is rarelyused on the industry level. There are a few exceptions, however (ref.). Bergstrand (1989) derives a gravity equation for a multi-industry world on that basis of a 2 x 2 x n Heckscher-Ohlin model, where n is the number of countries. The model allows for intra-industry trade.
Extensions to a higher industry dimension turn out to be cumbersome (see Bergstrand, 1989 ).
Estimation of this gravity equation an one-digit SITC industry level data of the 1960s and 1970s yield
plausible results.
explicit in Appendix (available upon request) ]. 6 An extensive robustness analysis is provided in Nahuis (2001) . 8 where X ijs stands for (log of) exports from country i to j in industry s. D EU is a dummy that equals unity if i and j are currently members of the EU (else zero), d measures distance between the countries i and j and Y(y) is the (log of) GDP (per capita) of the exporting and importing countries. The set D d denotes the other dummies included.
In estimating (1), we use data from 1998 for 16 industries and 26 countries. 5 The economic data are derived from GTAP (see section 2; McDougall, 1998; and CPB, 1999) ; the distance data are the Great Circle distances between capital cities. Further details about the data are provided in Nahuis (2001) . We estimate equation (1 ) ¡ with OLS.
The estimation results are reported in table 5, where t-statistics are reported below the parameter estimates. 6
Before turning to the EU-dummies, we take a closer look at the other parameters. The distance variable is negative and significant in all but one industry (Transport and Communication). The size of the estimated coefficient is, however, notably lower for service sectors. This indicates that, if the service sector's products are tradeable, distance matter less; a result that is intuitively clear once one thinks about financial services for example. The exporter and importer income coefficients are estimated precisely and are all positive. Eyeballing at these coefficients for a moment learns that all but two are less than unity, a common finding in the literature.
This implies that trade rises less than proportionally with size. Or, saying the same thing in a more familiar way: Now, turn to the EU dummies. In eleven out of sixteen industries, the dummy has a positive and significant coefficient. Hence, in these sectors, bilateral trade between two countries is higher if these countries are both members of the EU. The dummies measure thus measure the impact of the non-existence of implicit and explicit barriers to trade between countries of the EU. Intuitively clear -think about the CAP policy -the dummies for both Agriculture and Food Processing are among the largest. The dummy for Raw Materials is negative but insignificant; this may be due to oil being intensively traded between EU members and nonmembers alike. Textiles has a high and significant dummy. For Metals. and Machinery&Equipment the EU dummy is insignificant. In the service sectors the dummies are low and/or insignificant (an exception is Trade Services). An explanation is that the internal market has not progressed much so that EU membership does not lead to more intense trade patterns.
How to interpret these numbers? For industries with an insignificant dummy, we assume that accession to the internal market has no impact on trade. For other sectors, the dummy is used to calculate the potential trade increase. In particular, we assume that EU membership implies that the dummy would change from zero to one for bilateral trade patterns between an EU and the CEECs. Thus, potential trade can be calculated as exp( s ), where s denotes the estimated coefficient for the EU dummy in (1). To illustrate, the coefficient for the EU dummy in Food Processing is equal to 0.69 so that the potential trade is e. 0.69 1.99, i.e. twice as high as the actual trade between CEECs and EU members. The potential trade increase is therefore 99%.
The potential increase per sector in bilateral trade between the EU and the CEECs can be used to calculate the aggregate trade increase. To that end, we multiply the existing trade shares of the corresponding sectors with the potential trade increases .... Is this increase 'large'? Probably not! First of all, borders tend to be important impediments to trade. For example, a typical Canadian province trades 22 times more with another Canadian province than with a comparable neighbouring US state (see McCallum, 1995 and Helliwell, 1996) . For countries that are more different than Canada and the US, a border is likely to matter even more This suggests that a reduction in trade cost by joining the EU (a removal of economic borders) may have substantial effects on bilateral trade. Second, our estimates may still provide a lower bound on the trade effects because joining the EMU is a logical next sept for the CEECs. 7 Frankel and Rose (2000) find that joining a free trade area triples(!) trade and that joining a currency union triples trade once more! Though their study uses a broader sample of countries and, hence, is not entirely comparable, these results are suggestive. Finally, other studies using gravity models have also reported substantial trade effects from EU membership.
To translate the potential trade increases due into non-tariff barriers, we first re-calibrate the model so as to replicate trade volume predicted by the gravity model. This yields an alternative set of preference parameters for goods from different countries. Using these alternative parameters, we again re-calibrate a set of alternative prices in order to replicate the actual trade data again. These alternative prices consist of market prices, tariffs and virtual tariffs that can be interpreted as non-tariff barriers associated with non-membership of the internal market. Hence, these non-tariff barriers (NTB's) are comparable to actual tariffs. If we abolish the NTB's in the model, we will arrive at trade levels that correspond to the predictions from the gravity model. The appendix (available upon request) gives a more formal exposition of the calibration of the NTB's.
In principle, the predicted trade increases in table 5 capture the impact of both a reduction in formal trade barriers and the accession to the internal market. Table 6 presents the corresponding virtual tariffs that reflect the impact of accession to the internal market. Together with the formal trade barriers, these NTB's reflect the trade effect estimated by our gravity equation. immigrants in the first year after accession towards the EU. This flow gradually declines in subsequent years. In 2030, the stock of migrants in the current EU countries will have grown to 4 million, which is approximately 4% of the total population in the CEECs.
A nice feature of the study by Boeri et al. is that it gives an indication of the origin and destination of migrants. For instance, it suggests that 30% of all migrants originate from Poland, 7,5% from Hungary and the other part from the Rest CEECs. These shares depend not only on the size of countries, but also on the incentives for migration, determined by wage levels and employment rates. As the income gaps of Poland and Hungary with the EU are smaller than for the other CEECs, migration shares are somewhat lower for Hungary and Poland than their population sizes might suggest at first glance. From the migrants of the CEECs, 65% will move to Germany, 2,5% to France, 4% to the UK, 1% to the Netherlands, 7,5% to Southern Europe and 20% to the rest of Europe. Of this latter group, approximately 12% of the immigrants will go to Austria.
We use these figures in constructing our migration experiment in Worldscan (see 
Macro-economic effects
We now explore the implications of accession to the internal market. To that end, we simulate the gradual abolishment of the NTB's presented in table 6. In particular, we reduce the NTB's linearly between 2000 and 2020. The channels through which NTBs affect the economies in WorldScan are equivalent to those in case of a reduction in formal trade barriers, i.e. it exerts trade creation and causes changes in the terms-of-trade. There is one important difference between the abolishment of the NTB's and the elimination formal trade barriers analysed in the previous section, however. Whereas the formal barriers are disproportionately imposed by the CEECs relative to the EU, the NTB's refer to the EU and the CEECs alike.
The macroeconomic effects of accession to the internal market are presented in Table 8 . We see that the CEECs experience a terms-of-trade gain at the expense of a terms-of-trade loss in the EU countries. The terms-oftrade effect is determined by the sectoral trade pattern of countries. Indeed, if a country specializes its export in sectors that are affected substantially by accession to the internal market, the removal of NTB's is likely to improve its terms of trade since export prices tend to rise. The results in table 8 suggest that, indeed, the CEECs have a comparative advantage in sectors that are substantially affected by accession to the internal market (such as Textiles and Leather)
There is also a substantial difference in the magnitude of the terms-of-trade effects. This is because of the large trade-share of the CEECs that is affected by the NTBs, relative to the trade share for the EU.
Compared to the formal trade barriers, the virtual trade barriers are relatively large, especially on the side of the EU. Accordingly, trade creation is more substantial while also the magnitude of the terms-of-trade gain is relatively large. This boosts the value of the return to capital so that capital accumulation in the CEECs expands. Table 8 shows that GDP in 2020 is 10.4% higher in Hungary, 5.1% higher in Poland and 3.4% higher in Rest CEEC.
The macroeconomic effects for the EU countries are relatively small due to the small trade share with the CEECs. All EU countries benefit in terms of GDP because of the gains from trade creation. The effects on consumption are typically smaller due to the terms-of-trade losses in the EU. Table 11 reports the simulation results of the migration inflows. It reveals that the migration flow between 2004 and 2020 reduces the population in Hungary and Poland with about 2% in 2020 and more than 3%
in Rest CEEC. As imposed by the experiment, Germany attracts most migrants: its population will increase with about 2%. In the Rest EU population size will increase with 1%, while in the inflow in the other countries is much lower. The size of the migration flows determines the economic effects. 
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The analysis leads to the following sets of conclusions:
On methodology
• Modelling accession to the internal market as a uniform trade-cost reduction is inappropriate, the shock differs for different industries.
What is EU enlargement • Accession to the internal market if by far the most important effect of EU enlargement.
• The impact of 'free movement of labour' is small.
On winners and losers
• On the level of countries the enlargement of the EU knows only winners.
• Different industries are affected differently; it is important to acknowledge that on the industry level losers are inevitable.
A corollary of the first two conclusions is that redistribution of the gains might be necessary (especially when specific factors are important).
• The accession countries' gains are large (up to 1% a year). To translate the estimated potential trade volumes into non-tariff barriers we actually take four steps (one is not essential). The starting point is the demand equation following from the Armington demand system. The first step in the calibration, is the 'standard' procedure. This gives the parameters with a superscript C1 (calibration step 1). For each industry, we drop the industry subscript, we get:
where x is the trade from country i to country j. Preferences are given by s. X is total demand for the good produced in the industry. Prices (p) are determined by another procedure in the calibration procedure, therefore the bar indicates them as exogenous. The price-index P is a function of the (given) prices. Formal tariffs are denoted as t. Superscript D denotes data. Hence the preference parameter is used to calibrate the model such that it replicates the bi-lateral trade data. Second, we calculate the preferences required to produce the cet. par.
trade volume predicted by the gravity model:
where , the potential trade increase. X j is calculated such that it is consistent with the new bi-lateral trade flows. This gives the preference parameter s C2 that are consistent with the potential trade flows that would materialise if there where no non-tariff barriers. In the last step, we use this new preference parameter to calculate the non-tariff barriers. We re-calibrate the model to replicate the actual data again. For this we adjust the prices in the Armington demand system; we introduce a that is the non-tariff barrier. This gives a set of prices and parameters that re-produces the data and will produce the estimated trade flows if the tariff and nontariff barriers are reduced to zero.
Not essential, an intermediate step is taken; step three. To determine the price index in the last calibration step(4) --note that obviously only relative prices matter --we use the fact that on domestic goods the NTB is equal to zero by definition, hence
We use this to pin down the nominal prices. To be precise equations (3) and equation (4) make a system of equations that is to be solved simultaneously.
